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8b25643d08
_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload is called on a GMimeObject while walking the MIME tree of a message to determine whether that object is the payload. It doesn't make sense to name the argument "payload" if it might not be the payload, so we rename it to "part" for clarity. This is a non-functional change, just semantic cleanup. Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
217 lines
7 KiB
C
217 lines
7 KiB
C
/* notmuch - Not much of an email program, (just index and search)
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*
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* Copyright © 2012 Jameson Rollins
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*
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* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program. If not, see https://www.gnu.org/licenses/ .
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*
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* Authors: Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>
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*/
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include <strings.h>
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#define unused(x) x __attribute__ ((unused))
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#define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof (arr) / sizeof (arr[0]))
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void
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_notmuch_crypto_cleanup (unused(_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto))
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{
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}
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GMimeObject *
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_notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
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notmuch_decryption_policy_t decrypt,
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notmuch_message_t *message,
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GMimeMultipartEncrypted *part,
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GMimeDecryptResult **decrypt_result,
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GError **err)
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{
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GMimeObject *ret = NULL;
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if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_FALSE)
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return NULL;
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/* try decryption with session key if one is stashed */
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if (message) {
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notmuch_message_properties_t *list = NULL;
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for (list = notmuch_message_get_properties (message, "session-key", TRUE);
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notmuch_message_properties_valid (list); notmuch_message_properties_move_to_next (list)) {
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if (err && *err) {
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g_error_free (*err);
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*err = NULL;
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}
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if (attempted)
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*attempted = true;
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ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (part,
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GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE,
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notmuch_message_properties_value (list),
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decrypt_result, err);
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if (ret)
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break;
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}
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if (list)
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notmuch_message_properties_destroy (list);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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}
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if (err && *err) {
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g_error_free (*err);
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*err = NULL;
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}
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if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_AUTO)
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return ret;
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if (attempted)
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*attempted = true;
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GMimeDecryptFlags flags = GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE;
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if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_TRUE && decrypt_result)
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flags |= GMIME_DECRYPT_EXPORT_SESSION_KEY;
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ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (part, flags, NULL,
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decrypt_result, err);
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return ret;
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}
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static int
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_notmuch_message_crypto_destructor (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
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{
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if (! msg_crypto)
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return 0;
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if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
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g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
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if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
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talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
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return 0;
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}
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_notmuch_message_crypto_t *
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_notmuch_message_crypto_new (void *ctx)
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{
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_notmuch_message_crypto_t *ret = talloc_zero (ctx, _notmuch_message_crypto_t);
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talloc_set_destructor (ret, _notmuch_message_crypto_destructor);
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return ret;
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}
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notmuch_status_t
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_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeSignatureList *sigs)
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{
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if (! msg_crypto)
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
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/* Signatures that arrive after a payload part during DFS are not
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* part of the cryptographic envelope: */
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if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
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if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
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g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
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/* This signature list needs to persist as long as the _n_m_crypto
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* object survives. Increasing its reference counter prevents
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* garbage-collection until after _n_m_crypto_destroy is
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* called. */
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msg_crypto->sig_list = sigs;
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if (sigs)
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g_object_ref (sigs);
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if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL)
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msg_crypto->signature_encrypted = true;
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
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}
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notmuch_status_t
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_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *part, GMimeObject *parent, int childnum)
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{
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const char *protected_headers = NULL;
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const char *forwarded = NULL;
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const char *subject = NULL;
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if (! msg_crypto || ! part)
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
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/* only fire on the first payload part encountered */
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if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
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/* the first child of multipart/encrypted that matches the
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* encryption protocol should be "control information" metadata,
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* not payload. So we skip it. (see
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* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1847#page-8) */
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if (parent && GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (parent) && childnum == GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED_VERSION) {
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const char *enc_type = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (parent, "protocol");
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GMimeContentType *ct = g_mime_object_get_content_type (part);
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if (ct && enc_type) {
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const char *part_type = g_mime_content_type_get_mime_type (ct);
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if (part_type && strcmp (part_type, enc_type) == 0)
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
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}
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}
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msg_crypto->payload_encountered = true;
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/* don't bother recording anything if there is no cryptographic
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* envelope: */
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if ((msg_crypto->decryption_status != NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL) &&
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(msg_crypto->sig_list == NULL))
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
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/* Verify that this payload has headers that are intended to be
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* exported to the larger message: */
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/* Consider a payload that uses Alexei Melinkov's forwarded="no" for
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* message/global or message/rfc822:
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* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-smime-header-signing-05#section-4 */
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forwarded = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (part, "forwarded");
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if (GMIME_IS_MESSAGE_PART (part) && forwarded && strcmp (forwarded, "no") == 0) {
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GMimeMessage *message = g_mime_message_part_get_message (GMIME_MESSAGE_PART (part));
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subject = g_mime_message_get_subject (message);
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/* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
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} else {
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/* Consider "memoryhole"-style protected headers as practiced by Enigmail and K-9 */
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protected_headers = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (part, "protected-headers");
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if (protected_headers && strcasecmp ("v1", protected_headers) == 0)
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subject = g_mime_object_get_header (part, "Subject");
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/* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
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}
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if (subject) {
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if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
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talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
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msg_crypto->payload_subject = talloc_strdup (msg_crypto, subject);
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}
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
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}
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notmuch_status_t
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_notmuch_message_crypto_successful_decryption (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
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{
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if (! msg_crypto)
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
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/* see the rationale for different values of
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* _notmuch_message_decryption_status_t in util/crypto.h */
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if (! msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
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msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL;
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else if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_NONE)
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msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_PARTIAL;
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return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
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}
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