notmuch/util/crypto.c
Daniel Kahn Gillmor ab0ae8b1c0 util/crypto: _n_m_crypto_potential_payload returns whether part is the payload
Our _notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload implementation could
only return a failure if bad arguments were passed to it.  It is an
internal function, so if that happens it's an entirely internal bug
for notmuch.

It will be more useful for this function to return whether or not the
part is in fact a cryptographic payload, so we dispense with the
status return.

If some future change suggests adding a status return back, there are
only a handful of call sites, and no pressure to retain a stable API,
so it could be changed easily. But for now, go with the simpler
function.

We will use this return value in future patches, to make different
decisions based on whether a part is the cryptographic payload or not.
But for now, we just leave the places where it gets invoked marked
with (void) to show that the result is ignored.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
2019-09-01 08:38:11 -03:00

219 lines
7 KiB
C

/* notmuch - Not much of an email program, (just index and search)
*
* Copyright © 2012 Jameson Rollins
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see https://www.gnu.org/licenses/ .
*
* Authors: Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>
*/
#include "crypto.h"
#include <strings.h>
#include "error_util.h"
#define unused(x) x __attribute__ ((unused))
#define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof (arr) / sizeof (arr[0]))
void
_notmuch_crypto_cleanup (unused(_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto))
{
}
GMimeObject *
_notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
notmuch_decryption_policy_t decrypt,
notmuch_message_t *message,
GMimeMultipartEncrypted *part,
GMimeDecryptResult **decrypt_result,
GError **err)
{
GMimeObject *ret = NULL;
if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_FALSE)
return NULL;
/* try decryption with session key if one is stashed */
if (message) {
notmuch_message_properties_t *list = NULL;
for (list = notmuch_message_get_properties (message, "session-key", TRUE);
notmuch_message_properties_valid (list); notmuch_message_properties_move_to_next (list)) {
if (err && *err) {
g_error_free (*err);
*err = NULL;
}
if (attempted)
*attempted = true;
ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (part,
GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE,
notmuch_message_properties_value (list),
decrypt_result, err);
if (ret)
break;
}
if (list)
notmuch_message_properties_destroy (list);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (err && *err) {
g_error_free (*err);
*err = NULL;
}
if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_AUTO)
return ret;
if (attempted)
*attempted = true;
GMimeDecryptFlags flags = GMIME_DECRYPT_NONE;
if (decrypt == NOTMUCH_DECRYPT_TRUE && decrypt_result)
flags |= GMIME_DECRYPT_EXPORT_SESSION_KEY;
ret = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt (part, flags, NULL,
decrypt_result, err);
return ret;
}
static int
_notmuch_message_crypto_destructor (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
{
if (! msg_crypto)
return 0;
if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
return 0;
}
_notmuch_message_crypto_t *
_notmuch_message_crypto_new (void *ctx)
{
_notmuch_message_crypto_t *ret = talloc_zero (ctx, _notmuch_message_crypto_t);
talloc_set_destructor (ret, _notmuch_message_crypto_destructor);
return ret;
}
notmuch_status_t
_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeSignatureList *sigs)
{
if (! msg_crypto)
return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
/* Signatures that arrive after a payload part during DFS are not
* part of the cryptographic envelope: */
if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
/* This signature list needs to persist as long as the _n_m_crypto
* object survives. Increasing its reference counter prevents
* garbage-collection until after _n_m_crypto_destroy is
* called. */
msg_crypto->sig_list = sigs;
if (sigs)
g_object_ref (sigs);
if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL)
msg_crypto->signature_encrypted = true;
return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
bool
_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *part, GMimeObject *parent, int childnum)
{
const char *protected_headers = NULL;
const char *forwarded = NULL;
const char *subject = NULL;
if ((! msg_crypto) || (! part))
INTERNAL_ERROR ("_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload() got NULL for %s\n",
msg_crypto? "part" : "msg_crypto");
/* only fire on the first payload part encountered */
if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
return false;
/* the first child of multipart/encrypted that matches the
* encryption protocol should be "control information" metadata,
* not payload. So we skip it. (see
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1847#page-8) */
if (parent && GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (parent) && childnum == GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED_VERSION) {
const char *enc_type = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (parent, "protocol");
GMimeContentType *ct = g_mime_object_get_content_type (part);
if (ct && enc_type) {
const char *part_type = g_mime_content_type_get_mime_type (ct);
if (part_type && strcmp (part_type, enc_type) == 0)
return false;
}
}
msg_crypto->payload_encountered = true;
/* don't bother recording anything if there is no cryptographic
* envelope: */
if ((msg_crypto->decryption_status != NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL) &&
(msg_crypto->sig_list == NULL))
return false;
/* Verify that this payload has headers that are intended to be
* exported to the larger message: */
/* Consider a payload that uses Alexei Melinkov's forwarded="no" for
* message/global or message/rfc822:
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-smime-header-signing-05#section-4 */
forwarded = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (part, "forwarded");
if (GMIME_IS_MESSAGE_PART (part) && forwarded && strcmp (forwarded, "no") == 0) {
GMimeMessage *message = g_mime_message_part_get_message (GMIME_MESSAGE_PART (part));
subject = g_mime_message_get_subject (message);
/* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
} else {
/* Consider "memoryhole"-style protected headers as practiced by Enigmail and K-9 */
protected_headers = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (part, "protected-headers");
if (protected_headers && strcasecmp ("v1", protected_headers) == 0)
subject = g_mime_object_get_header (part, "Subject");
/* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
}
if (subject) {
if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
msg_crypto->payload_subject = talloc_strdup (msg_crypto, subject);
}
return true;
}
notmuch_status_t
_notmuch_message_crypto_successful_decryption (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
{
if (! msg_crypto)
return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
/* see the rationale for different values of
* _notmuch_message_decryption_status_t in util/crypto.h */
if (! msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL;
else if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_NONE)
msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_PARTIAL;
return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}